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Lawrence Garvin \(MVP\)
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"Harry Johnston" <> wrote in message
news:... > Lawrence Garvin (MVP) wrote: > >>> The detection logic is part of the Windows Update product, speaking in >>> the broader sense. >> >> Actually, this is a misconception. >> >> The =engine= is contained within the Windows Update Agent code. >> >> However, the =data= that tells that engine what to do is contained within >> the update package itself, and is unique to each update package. > > Yeah, but I'd define the Windows Update *product* to include both the > Windows Update Agent and the update packages - neither can function > without the other, after all. I understand that propensity for the common perception -- but the distinction is actually very significant. There's this natural inclination to want to blame WSUS, WUA, or the WSUS/WUA dev teams for failings that appear to be in the product, that are actually defects in the detection -parameters- defined by the update itself. Perhaps the most classic example I can recall off the top of my head is the (still existing) Snafu with the JVM update (KB816093). See this article for additional info: http://wsusinfo.onsitechsolutions.com/articles/004.htm Those update detection parameters are solely the output of the individual product team's Sustained Engineering groups -- and totally outside the purview of the WSUS/WUA teams. So, in the above example, the flaw lies in the work product of the JVM SE group -- no doubt which was long disbanded by the time the detection flaws in KB816093 were discovered by WSUS 2 admins in July, 2005. It's kind of like a beer distributor. They bring the Budweiser to you, and they're responsible if the glass is broken, or the cans are dented, but they got nothing to do with whether the beer tastes good, or whether you prefer MGD to Bud Select. >>> ... actually the other thing that puzzles me is why Windows File >>> Protection didn't kick in. >> >> Windows File Protection on a Windows 2000 Service Pack 3 system? > > Ah. That would explain it. I hadn't quite picked up on quite how far > back into the dark ages we were looking here. <VBG> >> However, in either situation, the *correct* installation methodology >> would have surely alleviated some of the issues experienced. > > Sure, but that's not my point. I think that if patch corruption isn't > reliably detected - regardless of what may have caused the corruption - > this is (or was!) a legitimate concern. I absolutely agree with you. But the appropriate procedures in 2003-2004 are entirely different than the appropriate procedures in 2007. In 2003, the situation require a much greater involvment of *human* verification and validation. > (It could - presumably - just as easily have happened as the result of a > recent but badly written third-party installer.) Granted, but either way, there's still a certain amount of undenyable responsibility that sits in the lap of the person at the console. > Does Windows File Protection address this problem? *Today* on a Win2003 or WinXP system, yes, WFP would definitely have prevented that snafu. Actually, the whole updated patch mechanism built into XP and 2003, which makes use of the %windir%\$hf_mig$ update cache folder, would have automatically replaced that downgraded DLL needed by MS03-026. In fact, just the other day I hit a wall with WFP trying to downgrade a WUA to do testing on the WUA upgrade patch for WSUS 3.0. Because the wups.dll files were installed from the WUA v7 package, and covered under WFP, when the WUA v5.8 installer tried to overwrite them via use of the /wuforce switch -- or when I tried to manually delete them and replace them with the v5.8 files -- WFP simply replaced the v7 files. In fact, it's this very technology that's obsoleted the legacy practice (on WinNT and Win2000) of having to 'reinstall' the latest service pack after every OS "life changing" event. > and slipstreaming was involved which I suppose bypasses WFP anyway. Possibly. I'd have to look at this. WFP is supposed to be protecting core "RTM" files also, so by that standard, slipstreamed updates should also be protected. On the other hand, if slipstreaming doesn't properly update the WFP registration database, WFP would have no way of knowing that a newer version had been replaced. Also, WFP is quite dependent on the "cache" copy of those files in the dllcache folder, and if they're not there, they wouldn't be replaceable. -- Lawrence Garvin, M.S., MCTS, MCP Independent WSUS Evangelist MVP-Software Distribution (2005-2007) https://mvp.support.microsoft.com/pr...2-D095EB07B36E Everything you need for WSUS is at http://technet2.microsoft.com/window...s/default.mspx And, almost everything else is at http://wsusinfo.onsitechsolutions.com ..... |
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Harry Johnston
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Lawrence Garvin (MVP) wrote:
>> Yeah, but I'd define the Windows Update *product* to include both the >> Windows Update Agent and the update packages - neither can function >> without the other, after all. > > I understand that propensity for the common perception -- but the > distinction is actually very significant. > > There's this natural inclination to want to blame WSUS, WUA, or the WSUS/WUA > dev teams for failings that appear to be in the product, that are actually > defects in the detection -parameters- defined by the update itself. I hadn't thought of looking at it that way. Certainly the actual update is not part of the Windows Update product; for example, if the update doesn't actually close the vulnerability it is supposed to address, that certainly isn't a Windows Update problem. By analogy, then, the detection parameters also aren't part of Windows Update, though the implementation of those parameters is. Harry. |
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Lawrence Garvin \(MVP\)
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Posts: n/a
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"Harry Johnston" <> wrote in message
news:... >> There's this natural inclination to want to blame WSUS, WUA, or the >> WSUS/WUA dev teams for failings that appear to be in the product, that >> are actually defects in the detection -parameters- defined by the update >> itself. > > I hadn't thought of looking at it that way. Certainly the actual update > is not part of the Windows Update product; for example, if the update > doesn't actually close the vulnerability it is supposed to address, that > certainly isn't a Windows Update problem. By analogy, then, the detection > parameters also aren't part of Windows Update, though the implementation > of those parameters is. Exactly. -- Lawrence Garvin, M.S., MCTS, MCP Independent WSUS Evangelist MVP-Software Distribution (2005-2007) https://mvp.support.microsoft.com/pr...2-D095EB07B36E Everything you need for WSUS is at http://technet2.microsoft.com/window...s/default.mspx And, almost everything else is at http://wsusinfo.onsitechsolutions.com ..... |
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Al Wilson
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I would like to dicuss a specific Example:
I have a scanner from a third party, and it indicates that a server is not patched with (MS08-069) Vulnerabilities In Microsoft XML Core Services Could Allow Remote Code Execution (955218) because -> VULN: File path (%systemroot%\system32\msxml6.dll) is NOT fixed. -> Function: DoesExistingFileMatch -> Required Version: 6.20.1099.0 -> Existing Version: 6.10.1200.0 With WSUS saying that the machine is patched, I wonder how it knows that? I suspect it is looking for the "uninstall" registry key. Can anyone help me out with a source of information? > On Tuesday, June 26, 2007 9:39 AM DRiberd wrote: > I am trying to figure out how WSUS currently determines how a patch is > missing from a server. Does it check the individual files in each patch and > then report it as missing if the files are at a previous version? > > I have seen in the past that software can install previous versions of dlls, > etc that "break" patches already applied. Windows Update from the web does > not recognize them as being needed again but the vulnerability still exists. >> On Tuesday, June 26, 2007 9:33 PM Lawrence Garvin \(MVP\) wrote: >> "D Riberdy" <> wrote in message >> news:E21AC0D6-1CE3-4B9C-BCE5-... >> >> The Windows Update Agent tells it that it's missing. >> >> >> The Windows Update Agent does a file level version check based on the >> metadata stored in the update detection logic, which is obtained from the >> WSUS Server during a detection event, provided that the update detection >> metadata contains file level version data. >> >> >> >> Only stupid software from stupid software developers on systems prior to >> Windows 2000, where the stupid software developer failed to check the >> version of the installed DLL prior to overwriting it with an older version >> contained in the stupid software developer's installation package. >> >> >> That really depends on what the update is; how old the update is; what >> detection methodology is coded into the update package's detection logic; >> what version of the operating system you're using; what version of the >> Windows Update Agent you're using; and whether or not the affected DLL(s) >> are actually part of any given update package. >> >> Do you have a *specific* example you'd like to discuss? >> >> >> >> -- >> Lawrence Garvin, M.S., MCTS, MCP >> Independent WSUS Evangelist >> MVP-Software Distribution (2005-2007) >> https://mvp.support.microsoft.com/pr...2-D095EB07B36E >> >> Everything you need for WSUS is at >> http://technet2.microsoft.com/window...s/default.mspx >> >> And, almost everything else is at >> http://wsusinfo.onsitechsolutions.com >> .... >>> On Wednesday, June 27, 2007 10:16 AM DRiberd wrote: >>> The actual incident in question was installing Microsoft Application Center >>> SP1 that undid the fix for the Blaster virus on all the servers we installed >>> it on. Even though Microsoft listed it as installed and said we were >>> protected an audit found us vulnerable. We had to switch to a 3rd party tool >>> becuase the customer felt that we and Microsoft were unable to properly >>> manage the patching and healthiness of the environment. >>> >>> So, If a, as you put it "Only stupid software from stupid software >>> developers" were to overlay a newer patches dll with an older version, will >>> WSUS then show it as missing? Or is that entirely dependent on the people >>> packaging the patches to insert all the proper data for WSUS to do that type >>> of checking ala "The Windows Update Agent does a file level version check >>> based on the metadata stored in the update detection logic, which is obtained >>> from the >>> WSUS Server during a detection event, provided that the update detection >>> metadata contains file level version data." >>> >>> DR >>> >>> "Lawrence Garvin (MVP)" wrote: >>>> On Wednesday, June 27, 2007 7:43 PM Lawrence Garvin \(MVP\) wrote: >>>> "D Riberdy" <> wrote in message >>>> news:BE35A31C-9AFD-441D-BDF8-... >>>> >>>> >>>> Interesting.... but a rather ancient problem, wouldn't you agree? The >>>> Blaster virus is almost four years old; Application Center 2000 SP1 >>>> (released: Oct 2001) actually pre-dates the Blaster virus by almost two >>>> years; and Application Center 2000 SP2 was released four years ago to >>>> support AppCenter2000 on Windows Server 2003. >>>> >>>> As for the Blaster virus itself, it actually exploits an issue that was >>>> fixed by MS03-026 (KB823980), which isn't even an active update anymore, >>>> having been superceded by a Service Pack on every operating system except >>>> Windows 2000. >>>> >>>> So, lacking a *current* example, let's take this scenario in the context it >>>> deserves. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> So, if I understand you correctly, you directly installed Application Center >>>> 2000 SP1 on top of a machine already containing MS03-026, and then were >>>> surprised when a 2 year old service pack replaced some files with older >>>> versions? >>>> >>>> Okay... so lessons learned: [a] Always install updates in chronological >>>> order of release. [b] Always run a security scan after applying any old >>>> updates. >>>> >>>> Also, keep in mind that the OS reporting an update as "Installed", merely >>>> means that the installer successfully ran, and that the necessary registry >>>> values were created. It indicates nothing about whether the component files >>>> are physically present, corrupted, or overwritten with an older version by >>>> some other installer. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Hmmm... and, in reality, it was probably nothing more than a deployment >>>> error in the installation of the AppCenter 2000 service pack. :-) >>>> >>>> To that extent, the customer was probably partially correct in expressing >>>> concern about your inability to properly manage the patching and healthiness >>>> of the enviornment. :-\ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> *TODAY*, with *WSUS* (or SMS, or WU/MU, or MBSA -- all of which use exactly >>>> the same scanning technology) (neither of which existed when you were >>>> installing AppCenter service packs on top of Blaster security vulnerability >>>> patches), all patches are *DETECTED* based on the requisite file contents >>>> and version numbers of those files. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> But, yes, WSUS/WUA is wholly dependent on the publisher of the UPDATE (which >>>> is generally the product group responsible for the specific product being >>>> updated), to properly configure the metadata for the detection logic of that >>>> update. Ergo, the Windows Update Agent can only do what the product team >>>> tells it to do via the update detection logic. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Exactly. >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Lawrence Garvin, M.S., MCTS, MCP >>>> Independent WSUS Evangelist >>>> MVP-Software Distribution (2005-2007) >>>> https://mvp.support.microsoft.com/pr...2-D095EB07B36E >>>> >>>> Everything you need for WSUS is at >>>> http://technet2.microsoft.com/window...s/default.mspx >>>> >>>> And, almost everything else is at >>>> http://wsusinfo.onsitechsolutions.com >>>> .... >>>>> On Thursday, June 28, 2007 8:24 AM DRiberd wrote: >>>>> "Lawrence Garvin (MVP)" wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> So, what you are saying is that I am at the mercy of a patch developer doing >>>>> their job correctly to ensure that the patches will scan correctly in WSUS? >>>>> Is this a standard routine for them to do or is there currently cases where >>>>> it doesn't have the correct information? Microsoft has been known to >>>>> re-re-release patches due to improperly packaged files before. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Actually, you understood me incorrectly. The above patch MS03-026 was >>>>> installed when the base machine was created with Windows Update. We >>>>> installed Microsoft Application Center 2000 SP1 as a complete application - >>>>> not just the SP1 patch. When we rescanned the machines at the end of the >>>>> build process, there were no updates to be found - ergo the logic built into >>>>> either the MS03-026 patch itself OR Windows Update was flawed. >>>>> >>>>> Therein lies their concern as well as ours that if we hang our hats on the >>>>> WSUS product, which by the looks of the forum posts here for version 3, has >>>>> less than spectaular commentary, that it will ensure that we are patched to >>>>> the fullest extent and rescan previously installed patches to make sure >>>>> nothing like the above happens. If it falls on the product team or WSUS >>>>> directly, it still is a "Microsoft" problem that things are not scanned >>>>> correctly. >>>>>> On Thursday, June 28, 2007 9:48 AM Asher_N wrote: >>>>>> =?Utf-8?B?RCBSaWJlcmR5?= <> wrote in >>>>>> news:90CB7FB6-DE83-4035-A98C-: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Well, Windows Update does what the patch tells it to do to detect, so >>>>>> it's not flawed. >>>>>> >>>>>> The update will look for either file versions, or more likely registry >>>>>> entries. So installing MS03-026 created the requisite entries and folders >>>>>> in the Windows folder. Then you load a 7 year old piece of software that >>>>>> blindly clobbers a bunch of DLLs. The MS03-026 registry entries are still >>>>>> there. What do you expect the detection to do? Scan version of every file >>>>>> it replaces? For large patches and SPs, it would consume too much >>>>>> resources on the clients. >>>>>> >>>>>> If you want to escape responsibility and lay the blame on Microsoft, then >>>>>> blame App Centre. >>>>>> >>>>>> Personnaly at this point, I'd upgrade App Centre to the cuttent version. >>>>>> Or at least, install it immediately after the OS, before patches. >>>>>>> On Thursday, June 28, 2007 2:28 PM DRiberd wrote: >>>>>>> *sigh* as Garvin noted this was an old problem. The point being we have used >>>>>>> other products and are now wanting to investigate WSUS as a possible solution >>>>>>> for patching. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Yes, I would expect that if I were to call for a scan of missing patches on >>>>>>> a server, it would check the file versions to ensure that they match with >>>>>>> what is is expected to be there. Other tools do the exact same thing and >>>>>>> don't seem to be consuming too many resources. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So far, I haven't really heard any good reason to vary from what we are >>>>>>> using to go to WSUS since we cannot expect that it would confidently tell us >>>>>>> what we want to know. I guess if you vary from the norm and don't kiss the >>>>>>> ring of Microsoft you get belittled on these forums. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> "Asher_N" wrote: >>>>>>>> On Thursday, June 28, 2007 2:38 PM Harry Johnston wrote: >>>>>>>> Asher_N wrote: >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> The detection logic is part of the Windows Update product, speaking in the >>>>>>>> broader sense. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> MBSA 1.2.1 seemed to manage to do this without being very resource-hungry. >>>>>>>> (Granted service packs are a special case.) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Probably qfecheck is the right tool to check for this class of problem. >>>>>>>> However, it does seem that this functionality should be built into WUA, or >>>>>>>> perhaps the OS. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ... actually the other thing that puzzles me is why Windows File Protection >>>>>>>> didn't kick in. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Are you suggesting that whenever we need to run a new application we should buy >>>>>>>> a new server? I don't think that's a feasible solution in general. :-) >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Harry. >>>>>>>>> On Thursday, June 28, 2007 10:54 PM Lawrence Garvin \(MVP\) wrote: >>>>>>>>> "D Riberdy" <> wrote in message >>>>>>>>> news:90CB7FB6-DE83-4035-A98C-... >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> You'd be at their mercy even if you used Microsoft Update! >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> You'd also be at their mercy if you solely relied on the verbage in the MSRC >>>>>>>>> or KB document. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> At some point ya either gotta trust your OS vendor to some point, or ya >>>>>>>>> gotta find a new OS vendor. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I'm afraid I can't help you much with your paranoia. ;-) >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Okay.. so either way.. what you're telling me is that you installed a >>>>>>>>> product whose release date preceeded the release date of security updates on >>>>>>>>> the system, and you never considered the need to evaluate whether those >>>>>>>>> security updates needed to be reinstalled? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Or, you misunderstood the significance of whatever tool you used to do the >>>>>>>>> "rescan". >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> But, again, that was in 2003, four years ago. It's really a pointless >>>>>>>>> discussion now. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Eh? >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Like I said above.. it matters not what the PRODUCT used to scan or install >>>>>>>>> the patch is -- ultimately, in *ANY* circumstance -- you're entirely >>>>>>>>> dependent upon the Microsoft Sustained Engineeering team(s) for the various >>>>>>>>> products to forsee every possible installation environment, and be able to >>>>>>>>> detect every possible installation scenario -- including somebody who'd want >>>>>>>>> to install a two year old product onto current hotfix security patches. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Bottom line is: That's why every "best practice" document in the world says >>>>>>>>> TEST TEST TEST TEST TEST. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Prove to YOURSELF that the patch installs correctly, doesn't break anything >>>>>>>>> on your systems, and does what you need it to do, and then, when you've done >>>>>>>>> that, deploy it to production systems. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> I really don't think there's much else I can say. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>> Lawrence Garvin, M.S., MCTS, MCP >>>>>>>>> Independent WSUS Evangelist >>>>>>>>> MVP-Software Distribution (2005-2007) >>>>>>>>> https://mvp.support.microsoft.com/pr...2-D095EB07B36E >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Everything you need for WSUS is at >>>>>>>>> http://technet2.microsoft.com/window...s/default.mspx >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> And, almost everything else is at >>>>>>>>> http://wsusinfo.onsitechsolutions.com >>>>>>>>> .... >>>>>>>>>> On Thursday, June 28, 2007 11:31 PM Lawrence Garvin \(MVP\) wrote: >>>>>>>>>> "Harry Johnston" <> wrote in message >>>>>>>>>> news:u$... >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Actually, this is a misconception. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The =engine= is contained within the Windows Update Agent code. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> However, the =data= that tells that engine what to do is contained within >>>>>>>>>> the update package itself, and is unique to each update package. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> It's generally this data that is the reason updates have "revisions", and >>>>>>>>>> MSRC documents are revised. Case in point -- just today Microsoft revised >>>>>>>>>> MS07-022 for issues affecting people running Windows 2000 Service Pack 4 on >>>>>>>>>> NEC 98 systems. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Thus my comments, elsewhere, indicting the "scanning tools" used to >>>>>>>>>> determine whether the post-install AppCenter2000SP1 system was secure. MBSA >>>>>>>>>> v1.2.1 didn't exist in 2003 when this incident happened. I know that it was >>>>>>>>>> 2003, because if it had been 2004 they surely would have installed >>>>>>>>>> AppCenter2000SP2 -- although that wouldn't have been any guarantee either, >>>>>>>>>> since AppCenter2000SP2 (Jun 2003) also predated MS03-026 (Jul 2003). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Hehe... so AppCenterSP2 was released *before* MS03-026, and they chose to >>>>>>>>>> install a slipstreamed *downlevel* version of the application. Go figger... >>>>>>>>>> but it was suicidal, at best (and, of course, we also have the benefit of >>>>>>>>>> hindsight to support that appelation). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Which then makes me want to ask when this really did occur, but either way, >>>>>>>>>> I think it would just complicate the decisions behind the deployment >>>>>>>>>> choices -- either way, the *current* version of the application was not >>>>>>>>>> installed. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Windows File Protection on a Windows 2000 Service Pack 3 system? Service >>>>>>>>>> Pack 4 was only released in June, 2003, and I suspect not yet installed on >>>>>>>>>> the subject system, given that they also were not installing AppCenterSP2 >>>>>>>>>> (Jun 2003). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> No, I don't think that's what Asher is suggesting, but then I also think >>>>>>>>>> that he's misunderstood that this incident is a legacy incident, that >>>>>>>>>> occurred four years ago, not in the recent past. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> It's also irrelevant, because AppCenter2000 isn't a supported product at >>>>>>>>>> all, any more. Mainstream Support expired in July, 2006. Only Security >>>>>>>>>> Updates for AppCenter2000SP2 are available, now. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> However, in either situation, the *correct* installation methodology would >>>>>>>>>> have surely alleviated some of the issues experienced. The *application* >>>>>>>>>> being installed was at a SP level dated from October, 2001, on top of a >>>>>>>>>> patch released in July, 2003 (and possibly, even, an unsupported SP level if >>>>>>>>>> this all happened after June 2004). >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> That means, de facto, the *application* had no knowledge of any updates >>>>>>>>>> applicable to that system beyond that date -- even the most current SP for >>>>>>>>>> that application could not have known. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The logical conclusion (at least to me) would be that *anything* released >>>>>>>>>> after that date was subject to having been corrupted. At a minimum I would >>>>>>>>>> have (RE)INSTALLED Service Pack 4 (Jun 2003), and all security patches >>>>>>>>>> released after Service Pack 4 (which would have included MS03-026) -- but >>>>>>>>>> then I would have also installed the product's most recent service pack as >>>>>>>>>> well. >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> The second problem was trusting the patch tools available at that point >>>>>>>>>> (Windows Update) to properly identify the deficiencies in the patch level of >>>>>>>>>> the system. In 2003, all that WU did was check a registry value to determine >>>>>>>>>> if a patch had been "installed" or "not installed". The only certain way to >>>>>>>>>> know was to personally verify the file versions and/or simply reapply the >>>>>>>>>> update(s) potentially affected -- and certainly any Critical Security >>>>>>>>>> Updates -- like a Blaster patch! >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>> Lawrence Garvin, M.S., MCTS, MCP >>>>>>>>>> Independent WSUS Evangelist >>>>>>>>>> MVP-Software Distribution (2005-2007) >>>>>>>>>> https://mvp.support.microsoft.com/pr...2-D095EB07B36E >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> Everything you need for WSUS is at >>>>>>>>>> http://technet2.microsoft.com/window...s/default.mspx >>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>> And, almost everything else is at >>>>>>>>>> http://wsusinfo.onsitechsolutions.com >>>>>>>>>> .... >>>>>>>>>>> On Thursday, June 28, 2007 11:59 PM Harry Johnston wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> Lawrence Garvin (MVP) wrote: >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Yeah, but I'd define the Windows Update *product* to include both the Windows >>>>>>>>>>> Update Agent and the update packages - neither can function without the other, >>>>>>>>>>> after all. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Ah. That would explain it. I hadn't quite picked up on quite how far back into >>>>>>>>>>> the dark ages we were looking here. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Sure, but that's not my point. I think that if patch corruption isn't reliably >>>>>>>>>>> detected - regardless of what may have caused the corruption - this is (or was!) >>>>>>>>>>> a legitimate concern. (It could - presumably - just as easily have happened as >>>>>>>>>>> the result of a recent but badly written third-party installer.) >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Does Windows File Protection address this problem? It seems that it should, but >>>>>>>>>>> I don't know a lot about exactly what it actually does. Certainly I've seen >>>>>>>>>>> QFECHECK report a problem when WFP was silent - but I'm still not sure whether >>>>>>>>>>> or not that was a false negative or a false positive, and slipstreaming was >>>>>>>>>>> involved which I suppose bypasses WFP anyway. >>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>> Harry. >>>>>>>>>>>> On Friday, June 29, 2007 12:38 AM Lawrence Garvin \(MVP\) wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>> "Harry Johnston" <> wrote in message >>>>>>>>>>>> news:... >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I understand that propensity for the common perception -- but the >>>>>>>>>>>> distinction is actually very significant. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> There's this natural inclination to want to blame WSUS, WUA, or the WSUS/WUA >>>>>>>>>>>> dev teams for failings that appear to be in the product, that are actually >>>>>>>>>>>> defects in the detection -parameters- defined by the update itself. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Perhaps the most classic example I can recall off the top of my head is the >>>>>>>>>>>> (still existing) Snafu with the JVM update (KB816093). See this article for >>>>>>>>>>>> additional info: http://wsusinfo.onsitechsolutions.com/articles/004.htm >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Those update detection parameters are solely the output of the individual >>>>>>>>>>>> product team's Sustained Engineering groups -- and totally outside the >>>>>>>>>>>> purview of the WSUS/WUA teams. So, in the above example, the flaw lies in >>>>>>>>>>>> the work product of the JVM SE group -- no doubt which was long disbanded by >>>>>>>>>>>> the time the detection flaws in KB816093 were discovered by WSUS 2 admins in >>>>>>>>>>>> July, 2005. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> It's kind of like a beer distributor. They bring the Budweiser to you, and >>>>>>>>>>>> they're responsible if the glass is broken, or the cans are dented, but they >>>>>>>>>>>> got nothing to do with whether the beer tastes good, or whether you prefer >>>>>>>>>>>> MGD to Bud Select. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> <VBG> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> I absolutely agree with you. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> But the appropriate procedures in 2003-2004 are entirely different than the >>>>>>>>>>>> appropriate procedures in 2007. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> In 2003, the situation require a much greater involvment of *human* >>>>>>>>>>>> verification and validation. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Granted, but either way, there's still a certain amount of undenyable >>>>>>>>>>>> responsibility that sits in the lap of the person at the console. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> *Today* on a Win2003 or WinXP system, yes, WFP would definitely have >>>>>>>>>>>> prevented that snafu. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Actually, the whole updated patch mechanism built into XP and 2003, which >>>>>>>>>>>> makes use of the %windir%\$hf_mig$ update cache folder, would have >>>>>>>>>>>> automatically replaced that downgraded DLL needed by MS03-026. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> In fact, just the other day I hit a wall with WFP trying to downgrade a WUA >>>>>>>>>>>> to do testing on the WUA upgrade patch for WSUS 3.0. Because the wups.dll >>>>>>>>>>>> files were installed from the WUA v7 package, and covered under WFP, when >>>>>>>>>>>> the WUA v5.8 installer tried to overwrite them via use of the /wuforce >>>>>>>>>>>> switch -- or when I tried to manually delete them and replace them with the >>>>>>>>>>>> v5.8 files -- WFP simply replaced the v7 files. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> In fact, it's this very technology that's obsoleted the legacy practice (on >>>>>>>>>>>> WinNT and Win2000) of having to 'reinstall' the latest service pack after >>>>>>>>>>>> every OS "life changing" event. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Possibly. I'd have to look at this. WFP is supposed to be protecting core >>>>>>>>>>>> "RTM" files also, so by that standard, slipstreamed updates should also be >>>>>>>>>>>> protected. On the other hand, if slipstreaming doesn't properly update the >>>>>>>>>>>> WFP registration database, WFP would have no way of knowing that a newer >>>>>>>>>>>> version had been replaced. Also, WFP is quite dependent on the "cache" copy >>>>>>>>>>>> of those files in the dllcache folder, and if they're not there, they >>>>>>>>>>>> wouldn't be replaceable. >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>> Lawrence Garvin, M.S., MCTS, MCP >>>>>>>>>>>> Independent WSUS Evangelist >>>>>>>>>>>> MVP-Software Distribution (2005-2007) >>>>>>>>>>>> https://mvp.support.microsoft.com/pr...2-D095EB07B36E >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> Everything you need for WSUS is at >>>>>>>>>>>> http://technet2.microsoft.com/window...s/default.mspx >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>> And, almost everything else is at >>>>>>>>>>>> http://wsusinfo.onsitechsolutions.com >>>>>>>>>>>> .... >>>>>>>>>>>>> On Friday, June 29, 2007 3:08 AM Harry Johnston wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> Lawrence Garvin (MVP) wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> I hadn't thought of looking at it that way. Certainly the actual update is not >>>>>>>>>>>>> part of the Windows Update product; for example, if the update doesn't actually >>>>>>>>>>>>> close the vulnerability it is supposed to address, that certainly isn't a >>>>>>>>>>>>> Windows Update problem. By analogy, then, the detection parameters also aren't >>>>>>>>>>>>> part of Windows Update, though the implementation of those parameters is. >>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>> Harry. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> On Friday, June 29, 2007 8:12 PM Lawrence Garvin \(MVP\) wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Harry Johnston" <> wrote in message >>>>>>>>>>>>>> news:... >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Exactly. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> -- >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lawrence Garvin, M.S., MCTS, MCP >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Independent WSUS Evangelist >>>>>>>>>>>>>> MVP-Software Distribution (2005-2007) >>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://mvp.support.microsoft.com/pr...2-D095EB07B36E >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Everything you need for WSUS is at >>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://technet2.microsoft.com/window...s/default.mspx >>>>>>>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>>>>>>> And, almost everything else is at >>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://wsusinfo.onsitechsolutions.com >>>>>>>>>>>>>> .... >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Submitted via EggHeadCafe - Software Developer Portal of Choice >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Lucene.Net Indexing Searching Entry Level Tutorial >>>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.eggheadcafe.com/tutorials...-tutorial.aspx |
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Harry Johnston
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On 2010-09-25 2:58 a.m., Al Wilson wrote:
> I have a scanner from a third party, and it indicates that a server is not > patched with (MS08-069) Vulnerabilities In Microsoft XML Core Services Could > Allow Remote Code Execution (955218) because > > > -> VULN: File path (%systemroot%\system32\msxml6.dll) is NOT fixed. > > > -> Function: DoesExistingFileMatch > > > -> Required Version: 6.20.1099.0 > > > -> Existing Version: 6.10.1200.0 > > With WSUS saying that the machine is patched, I wonder how it knows that? I > suspect it is looking for the "uninstall" registry key. WSUS doesn't distinguish between updates that are installed and updates that aren't applicable, so perhaps your system doesn't meet the requirements? It might also turn out that MSXML6 isn't actually installed, but the file got left behind. Which OS is this on? Which service pack? If Windows 2003, does MSXML6 appear in Add/Remove Programs? Harry. -- PS: if it seems quiet in here, that's because Microsoft have closed this newsgroup. You might want to consider visiting the appropriate web forum instead. WSUS: http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkID=161025 Windows Update: http://social.answers.microsoft.com/...istawu/threads |
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