"Hank Arnold" <> wrote in message
news:...
> "The users all have read/write access to the log file, and could modify it
> to meet their needs, whether to hide their own tracks or to point the
> finger of blame at someone else."
>
> Pardon me???? Is this true? Why on earth would you allow this kind of
> access? Or am I missing something?
I *allow* this kind of access, because, in order to append to a file, the
users need write access. But this is perfectly OK in our environment because
we use this to track logon activities for purposes other than security
auditing, i.e.:
- to track workstations. if we know who logged on when, that gives us an
idea where it might be located. If we actually need to find it, we do not
assume it to be found until we actually see it somewhere, so we are not
basing our inventory reconciliation on the information in the log file.
- to help identify idle or abandoned accounts. we don't assume they are
abandoned if their most recent record is a long time ago - we just know
which managers to approach for confirmation that people have left.
The data is very reliable, however this would change if it were know that
this facility was being used to track employees in some manner, a thing we
religiously refuse to do.
We have also implemented a scheduled task that collects the logs and moves
them into a folder the users cannot access every hour or so. Again not 100%
foolproof, but better than leaving the historical logs wide open.
/Al
>
> --
>
> Regards,
> Hank Arnold
> Microsoft MVP
> Windows Server - Directory Services
> http://mypcassistant.blogspot.com/
>
> Al Dunbar wrote:
>>
>> "Pegasus [MVP]" <> wrote in message
>> news:#...
>
>>
>> While a useful technique (that I have also used), I have made it clear to
>> management that this is not really an auditing tool. The users all have
>> read/write access to the log file, and could modify it to meet their
>> needs, whether to hide their own tracks or to point the finger of blame
>> at someone else.
>>
>> /Al
>>